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INSURANCE
WESLEY M. WALKER*
During the past year the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit still felt the impact of hurricane "Hazel"
which brought destruction to beaches in South Carolina in
October of 1954. Two cases were before this court which arose
out of damages resulting from "Hazel". The case of Fire-
men's Ins. Co. v. Senseney,1 an action against the insurer on a
windstorm policy covering insured's house for loss caused by
windstorm but excluding loss caused by water whether driven
by wind or not, was heard without a jury by the district judge
who found that damage to insured's house was caused by an-
other house being blown against it rather than having been
floated against it by action of wind driven water. This being
a pure question of fact and there being nothing in the record
to justify a holding that the judge's finding was clearly
erroneous, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
court below.
The case of Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. IVey, 2 an action on a
windstorm policy providing for loss covered by windstorm but
excluding loss caused by water, whether driven by wind or
not, was heard by a jury which found a verdict for plaintiff
insured. The question raised on appeal was the sufficiency of
the evidence to take the case to the jury, there being evidence
that even after the washing away of part of the foundation,
the building would have stood indefinitely if the wind had not
blown against it in such a way as to completely wreck it. The
Court of Appeals held a case was properly made for the jury's
consideration.
Fraudulent Breach of Contract
On a policy of life insurance issued by defendant to the
husband of plaintiff in the case of Cain v. United Ins. Co.,8
and naming plaintiff beneficiary, the defendant insurance
*Member of the firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Green-
ville A.B., 1936, University of South Carolina; LL.B., 1938, University
of South Carolina; Attorney, City of Greenville, 1949-1951; member
Greenville County, South Carolina and American Bar Associations.
1. 250 F. 2d 130 (4th Cir. 1957).
2. 250 P. 2d 110 (4th Cir. 1957).
3. 232 S. C. 397, 102 S. E. 2d 360 (1958).
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company denied liability upon the ground that the policy was
procured by fraudulent misrepresentations. A verdict of the
jury for actual and punitive damages was set aside by the
trial judge who directed that judgment be entered in favor of
defendant. The insured represented in his application that he
was in good health and had not been confined to a hospital
within the past two years when, as a matter of fact, upon his
death it was disclosed that he had been confined to the
Veterans Hospital.
The Court held that the action of the plaintiff for fraudulent
breach of contract, regarded as an action ex contractu, must
fail. To sustain such a cause of action, there must be a
valid contract. There was not a valid contract in this case as
the policy was procured by fraud. The Court further held
that even if, shortly after the death of insured, insurer's agent
improperly obtained possession of policy and receipt book and
the company undertook to cancel the policy, such acts would
not vitalize the insurance contract.
Wrongful Cancellation of Policy
The case of Winchester v. United Ins. Co.4 involved an ac-
tion by insured against health and accident insurer for alleged
wrongful cancellation of a policy. From a judgment for plain-
tiff insured, the company appealed and the Supreme Court
held, reversing and remanding the case, that damages for
wrongful cancellation of health and accident policy could not
include an amount representing benefits to which insured
would have been entitled had he required surgery or which
would have been paid had he sustained an accidental death
inasmuch as these damages might never accrue. Proof as to
probability of such damages must be established with reason-
able certainty.
In the second Winchester case,5 an action to recover for
alleged wrongful cancellation of another insurance policy, the
Supreme Court held that, properly construed, the policy in
question providing for hospitalization and accidental death
benefits could be cancelled in event premiums were not paid
when due or within grace period and that it had been error for
the trial court to refuse a request to so instruct the jury. An
insurer cannot, however, forfeit a policy for non-payment of
4. 231 S. C. 462, 99 S. E. 2d 28 (1957).
5. Winchester v. United Ins. Co., 231 S. C. 483, 99 S. E. 2d 34 (1957).
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premium if it was indebted to insured on due date for an
amount equal to or greater than the amount of the premium.
Disability Under Policy
The plaintiff in Robinson v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co.0 was
insured under a policy of insurance issued by defendant where-
by it was agreed that the company would pay plaintiff a cer-
tain sum as weekly indemnity for loss incurred as a result of
accidental bodily injury. Plaintiff was shot by another person
and disabled for a period of time. The sole question was
whether or not the cause of the disability was accidental. The
testimony was to the effect that the gun had been picked up
by the person who fired the shot merely to scare plaintiff and
that she had no intention of shooting and plaintiff had no
reason to believe she would shoot. The trial judge found
that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the
entire testimony was that the injury was not provoked by
plaintiff and was unforeseen as far as he was concerned.
The Supreme Court held that it was for the trial judge to
determine, based on the evidence before him, whether or not
plaintiff was injured by the intentional act of another and
whether plaintiff should have foreseen that his conduct would
probably result in his injury- further, that there was evi-
dence to support the findings of the trial judge determining
these issues in favor of plaintiff.
In the case of Kilgore v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.7 action was
brought on a policy insuring plaintiff against loss of life, limb,
sight or time resulting directly and independently of all other
causes from accidental bodily injury sustained while the policy
was in effect. The sole question before the Supreme Court
was whether the court below erred in refusing defendant's
motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that the acci-
dental injury suffered by plaintiff was not the sole cause of
his disability, defendant claiming that plaintiff had a pre-
existing arthritic condition which contributed to or cooperated
with the injury and caused the disability. Plaintiff had
slipped on a wet floor and fallen on his back and his dis-
ability resulted thereafter although the evidence was to the
effect that he had a latent pre-existing arthritic condition.
The Court held that the fact that plaintiff had not suffered
6. 232 S. C. 268, 101 S. E. 2d 664 (1958).
7. 231 S. C. 111, 97 S. E. 2d 392 (1957).
[Vol. II
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any from this condition prior to the fall was some evidence that
his disability was due to the fall; the doctor's testimony was
that the condition was dormant and only became active after
the accident and the Court stated such conclusion would war-
rant recovery -that plaintiff was not required to be in per-
fect health at the time of the accident in order to recover
disability benefits under the policy.
Sound Health
The facts in the case of Bowling v. Palmetto State Life Ins.
Co.8 were that the plaintiff's deceased father made application
for insurance, the application providing that the policy, if
issued, should become effective "if the life proposed is alive
and in sound health at date of policy". On January 23, 1954
the initial premium was accepted and the receipt therefor
provided that acceptance was subject to terms of the policy;
that one of the policy conditions was that it would take effect
on the date of its issuance provided insured was then alive and
in good health. The policy was prepared and mailed by the
home office to the Greenville office on January 28 with five
other policies all dated February 1, 1954 and all appeared on
the "Life Register" dated January 25, 1954. The policy was
never delivered to the applicant. The accident which caused
the death of plaintiff's father occurred January 23, 1954,
before acceptance or rejection of the application for insurance.
Testimony was permitted, over objections of defendant's at-
torneys, to the effect that the agent of the company told
deceased at the time he paid the premium that the policy
became effective immediately.
The Court held that the written application and the written
receipt for the initial premium constituted the agreement be-
tween deceased and the defendant and that they constituted a
a contract not for present insurance but for issuance and
delivery of a policy to be effective if applicant were alive and
in sound health on the date of the contemplated policy. By
some thread, not easily perceivable, the Court distinguished
this case from that of Cantor v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co.,9
and held that the testimony to the effect that the receipt for
the premium was intended to put the insurance in force at
8. 231 S. C. 613, 99 S. E. 2d 407 (1957).
9. 161 S. C. 198, 159 S. E. 542 (1931), and subsequent appeal, 169
S. C. 338, 168 S. E. 848 (1933).
19581
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once was inadmissible, it purporting to establish by parol a
contemporaneous agreement at variance with the terms of
the written contract. Recovery could not be predicated upon
the policy being shown on the "Life Register" and having been
mailed before death of applicant. Thus, plaintiff's father,
having suffered a mortal injury on January 23 was not in
sound health on the date of its issuance.
Fire Policies
Lundy v. Lititz Mutual Ins. Co.10 involved a suit on a policy
insuring plaintiff's dwelling against fire for a period of one
year. The house was destroyed by fire on January 27, 1956
and the defense interposed was that the policy was cancelled
on August 5, 1955 and the unearned premium remitted to and
accepted by the insured. The insurer appealed from a judg-
ment against it for the face amount of the policy.
The policy provided for cancellation at any time by the
company by giving five days' written notice of cancellation
with or without tender of the excess of paid premiums above
the pro rata premium for the expired time and if not tendered,
should be refunded on demand. The insurance company sent
to insured a check covering such refund of premium with
notation thereon that the policy on the house was thereby
cancelled, and the check was cashed some months later by
plaintiff. Along with the check, in the same envelope, was a
notice that policy on the store of insured was cancelled. The
testimony of insured and agent of the company was conflicting
as to statements made by the agent to insured regarding said
check and notice enclosed and'the Court held that the evi-
dence presented a question for the jury as to whether the
house policy had been cancelled - that notice of cancellation
must be unambiguous; otherwise, it must be resolved in favor
of insured.
The case of Tires, Inc. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co." was a de-
claratory judgment action brought by a group of fire insurance
companies to have the court construe whether or not the facts
of a rather large loss to the insured showed an explosion
within the terms and provisions of fire insurance policies
issued by the companies which had extended coverage endorse-
ments. The insured demanded trial by jury and the jury de-
10. 232 S. C. 1, 100 S. E. 2d 544 (1957).
11. 253 F. 2d 411 (4th Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 11
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termined the issue in favor of the insurance companies, find-
ing that no explosion occurred. An interesting evidentiary
question arose concerning the admissibility of the sworn proof
of loss filed by the insured setting forth that the cause and
origin of the loss sustained was, "ruptured water main, eight
inch water main in front of store was ruptured by air ham-
mer, flooding building, breaking windows, and deluging con-
tents". The insurance companies contended that the proof
was admissible as being a previous statement under oath con-
trary to the asserted position of the insured that its loss had
occurred by reason of an explosion. The insured took the
position that the proof was inadmissible since the insurance
company had rejected the proof and, therefore, had no right
to demand a proof of loss. The Court of Appeals held that the
proof of loss was clearly competent as an admission against
interest even though denial of liability by the insurance com-
pany waived the necessity for such proof. The court cited
Orenstein v. Star Ins. Co. 1 2 which case also arose from South
Carolina.
The insured also argued upon appeal that its motion for a
directed verdict should have been granted and the court
should have concluded as a matter of law that an explosion had
occurred. A water main in front of plaintiff's place of business
burst and the insurance company contended the cause of the
rupture was the operation of an air hammer by a plumbing
company and that this air hammer punctured the water line
releasing the water while the insured contended that the vibra-
tions of the air set up a water hammer inside the water main
and that this water hammer caused an explosion within the
meaning of the word as used in the policy. Expert testimony
was offered by both the parties and the Court of Appeals held
that whether or not an explosion occurred was clearly a mat-
ter for the jury to decide.
Defense by Insurer
Plaintiff brought suit against the insurance company in
Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Thornton 3 after obtaining judgment against insured
under an automobile liability policy. The summons was turned
over to the insurance agency which had issued the policy on
12. 10 F. 2d 754 (4th Cir. 1926).
13. 244 F. 2d 823 (4th Cir. 1958).
1958]
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the twenty-first day after service had been made, one day
after the time for answering had expired. The insurance com-
pany maintained that there was unreasonable delay in deliver-
ing this paper. The company also claimed it did not receive
the summons until some three months after the time for
answering had expired and at such time, it obtained a non-
waiver agreement from the insured. Upon receiving the pa-
per, the insurance company raised a technical question as to
the validity of service on the insured, who was a prisoner in
the State penitentiary at the time. The insurer claimed that
under the terms of the policy the insured agreed to deliver all
papers served on him without unreasonable delay. The
Supreme Court held that what was a reasonable time was a
question of fact for the jury and was decided against the com-
pany in this case and, further, that insurer could not, after
choosing to raise a technical question instead of seeking leave
to defend on merits, successfully insist that it had been re-
leased from its obligations because papers were delivered to
it too late. And although the insurance company had obtained
a non-waiver agreement and was proceeding under a reserva-
tion of its rights, it could not take control of the case and yet
let many weeks pass by before interposing a plea. Its dilatory
procedure was not protected by the non-waiver agreement.
Procedure
Of the two actions of Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co.
and Ross v. American Standard Ins. Corp.,14 consolidated on
appeal, one was to recover damages for fraudulent breach of
an insurance policy and the other to recover damages for
fraud and deceit in inducing plaintiff to enter into a contract
of insurance. The trial judge, upon motion of defendants to
set aside the service of the summons, refused to grant such
motion and defendants appealed.
The defendants -insurance companies - were Indiana
corporations, neither having been licensed to do business in
South Carolina nor maintaining any office, having any pro-
perty or having any agent in the State of South Carolina.
Plaintiff, in 1948, applied by mail to defendant, American
Standard Insurance Corp., for an accident and health in-
surance policy which was issued to plaintiff and received by
him through the mail. In 1955 plaintiff was notified that
14. 232 S. C. 433, 102 S. E. 2d 743 (1958).
[Vol. 11
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American Income Life Insurance Co. had entered into a re-
insurance agreement with the American Standard Insurance
Corp. and he, thereafter, received a reinsurance certificate
from American Standard and paid all premiums to that com-
pany. Plaintiff claimed insurer wrongfully cancelled said
policy on May 14, 1956.
Service of the summons and complaint was had upon the
Insurance Commissioner in accordance with section 37-265
of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina.' 5
Appellant insurance companies contended the statute con-
stitutes a denial of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly if construed as applicable to the
issuance and delivery of a single policy and that, further, if
the statute is valid, substituted service may not be had under
it in tort actions.
The Court held, with regard to the question of service, that
the statute did not violate the constitutional rights of the
foreign insurer and reinsurer although their only contact was
through issuance and delivery by mail of a single policy.
As to the contention of appellants that service could not be
had under the statute in a tort action, the Court assumed
that one complaint was for breach of an insurance policy
accompanied by fraudulent acts and the other for fraud and
deceit in inducing plaintiff to purchase said insurance policy.
A cause of action for fraudulent breach of a contract, being
regarded under our decisions as ex contractu, the Court stated
that it was clear that such an action is within the scope of our
act authorizing service upon the Insurance Commissioner. 16
The Court held service should be vacated in the action for
fraud and deceit, it not arising out of the insurance policy
and not being ex contractu.
In the case of Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co.,"7 the appeal was from an order denying a motion to
change the place of trial. The accident resulting in this action
occurred in Berkeley County and involved three vehicles: a
15. Section 37-265: "The issuance and delivery of a policy of insurance
or contract of insurance or indemnity to any person in this State or the
collection of a premium thereon by any insuror not licensed in this State,
as herein required, shall irrevocably constitute the Commissioner and his
successors in office the true and lawful attorney in fact upon whom
service of any and all processes, pleadings, actions or suits arising out of
such policy or contract in behalf of such insured may be made."
16. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-265.
17. 232 S. C. 392, 102 S. E. 2d 266 (1958).
1958]
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
truck driven by plaintiff, a school bus (the liability carrier
being Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.), and an
International truck. Plaintiff brought action in Berkeley
County for personal injuries against Nationwide and the In-
ternational truck and Griffin, the driver thereof. The de-
fendant Griffin moved for an order changing the place of
trial to Colleton County, the residence of said Griffin, upon
the ground that Nationwide was a sham and immaterial de-
fendant and that plaintiff's cause of action, if any, accrued
in the Court of Common Pleas for Colleton, not Berkeley,
County as the defendant was a resident of Colleton County
and the International truck was located in Colleton County.
The Supreme Court held that the action against liability in-
surer of operation of State-owned school bus was properly
laid in county in which the accident involving the school bus
took place and, further, that the complaint stated a cause of
action against Nationwide Mutual as well as against the other
defendants named.
The question before the Court in the case of McLeod v.
Rose'8 was whether the court below erred in refusing de-
fendant's motion for a mistrial upon the ground that plain-
tiff's counsel brought out the fact that defendant was pro-
tected by liability insurance. A police officer, witness for
defendant, had given a statement to an insurance adjuster at
the time of the accident. Defendant knew this and that the
statement had been shown to the police officer right before he
went on the witness stand. On cross examination, this witness
was asked who he gave the statement to and the reply was:
"To the insurance adjuster".
The Court concluded that defendant should have objected
to the question before the answer was given and that the
question itself was subject to more than one reasonable con-
clusion. The factor of the witness implying protection by lia-
bility insurance being a witness of defendant is a factor to be
properly considered by the court in determining whether to
grant a mistrial.
The Court held in the case of Crook v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co.,'9 inter alia, that the action, being one
based upon contract, was subject to any proper defense by the
18. 231 S. C. 209, 97 S. E. 2d 899 (1957).
19. 231 S. C. 257, 98 S. E. 2d 427 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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insurance company under the terms of its contract. The in-
surer set forth in its answer a violation of the policy. The
Court stated that the allegations tended to show a state of
facts under which the insurer would be relieved of liability,
even if the allegations of the complaint were all true and that
the lower court was in error in granting the motion to strike
the stated allegations of the answer.
Regulation of Insurance Companies
The question involved in Clark v. Preferred Accident Ins.
Co. 2 0 was whether the $50,000 in government bonds deposited
as a prerequisite to doing a surety business in South Carolina
might be treated as assets of the insolvent company or, since
no surety claims had been filed, might be withdrawn by the
foreign statutory liquidator, in toto, without being subject to
costs or other claims against the insolvent debtor. The Court
determined that the statutory liquidator had title to assets of
the insolvent corporation subject to rights and limits of credi-
tors pursuing same against local assets. The title of the statu-
tory liquidator of a foreign corporation must be given full
faith and credit but it is subject to rights and remedies of
creditors pursuing same in the state where the property is
located.
20. 231 S. C. 167, 97 S. E. 2d 498 (1957).
1958]
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